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In his Presidential Address to the Econometric Society, Sen (1993) constructed an ar-
gument which seems to go against a priori imposition of the requirement of internal
consistency of choice such as the weak axiom of revealed preference (Samuelson, 1938;
1947; 1948), the strong axiom of revealed preference (Houthakker, 1950), Arrow’s axiom
of choice consistency (Arrow, 1959), and Sen’s condition α (Sen, 1971), and investigated
the logical implications of eschewing these internal choice consistency requirements. On
the face of it, Sen’s argument may seem to go squarely against the theory of rationaliz-
ability due to Arrow (1959), Richter (1966; 1971), Hansson (1968), Sen (1971), Suzumura
(1976a), and many others. This paper argues that there is in fact a way of constructing
a bridge between Sen’s criticism against the requirement of internal consistency of choice
and the traditional framework of rational choice. For the sake of pursuing this salvage
activity, we introduce a novel concept of norm-conditional rationalizability, which helps
us establish the peaceful co-existence of the rationalizability approach and Sen’s criticism
against the requirement of internal consistency of choice.
The gist of our approach is simple and intuitive. In the presence of external norms,
some alternatives, which are physically feasible, may not necessarily be choosable with-
out violating the given norm. It should be clear that this additional constraint imposed
by the prevailing norm should be taken into due consideration in deﬁning the rational-
ity, or the lack thereof, of observed choice behavior. The concept of norm-conditional
rationalizability is nothing other than a modiﬁcation of the traditional concept of ratio-
nalizability that takes into account additional restrictions imposed by the norm. Along
with this modiﬁcation, the standard revealed preference relations must be amended in
an analogous manner. Once we implement these modiﬁcations, we establish the theory
of norm-conditional rationalizability, which is a natural generalization of the traditional
theory of rationalizability. Indeed, the novel theory of norm-conditional rationalizability
boils down to the traditional theory of rationalizability in the absence of external norms.
More precisely, a norm can be expressed by specifying pairs of alternatives and feasible
sets containing the requisite alternative such that the choice of the alternative from this
set is prohibited by the norm under considerations. We will give speciﬁc examples in
the next section when discussing Sen’s (1993) criticisms of internal choice consistency
properties.
Apart from this introduction, this paper consists of six sections. In Section 2, we
examine Sen’s criticism directed towards conditions expressing internal choice consistency
1properties and motivate our concept of external norms and that of norm-conditional
rationalizability. Section 3 is devoted to the formalization of the basic ingredients of
our analysis. In Section 4, we state our main results. Section 5 discusses two alternative
formulations of the concept of external norms and show that these alternative formulations
are essentially equivalent to the formulation utilized in this paper. We will also make a
few brief remarks on some earlier attempts to accommodate Sen’s (1993) criticism on
the internal consistency of choice. Section 6 concludes with some remarks on related
literature. Section 7 gathers all the proofs.
2 Sen’s Criticism of Internal Consistency of Choice
Let C be the choice function that speciﬁes, for any admissible non-empty set S of feasible
alternatives, a non-empty subset C(S) of S, which is to be called the choice set of S.
Then Sen (1993, p.500) poses the following question: “[C]an a set of choices really be
seen as consistent or inconsistent on purely internal grounds without bringing in some-
thing external to choice, such as the underlying objectives or values that are pursued or
acknowledged by choice?” To bring his point into clear relief, Sen invites us to examine
the following two choices:
C({x,y}) = {x} and C({x,y,z}) = {y}.
As Sen rightly points out, this pair of choices violates most of the standard choice consis-
tency conditions including the weak and the strong axioms of revealed preference, Arrow’s
axiom of choice consistency, and Sen’s condition α. It is arguable and indeed Sen (1993,
p.501) argues that this seeming inconsistency can be easily resolved if only we know more
about the person’s choice situation: “Suppose the person faces a choice at a dinner table
between having the last remaining apple in the fruit basket (y) and having nothing instead
(x), forgoing the nice-looking apple. She decides to behave decently and picks nothing
(x), rather than the one apple (y). If, instead, the basket had contained two apples, and
she had encountered the choice between having nothing (x), having one nice apple (y)
and having another nice one (z), she could reasonably enough choose one (y), without
violating any rule of good behavior. The presence of another apple (z) makes one of the
two apples decently choosable, but this combination of choices would violate the standard
consistency conditions ...even though there is nothing particularly ‘inconsistent’ in this
pair of choices ... .”
On the face of it, Sen’s argument to this eﬀect may seem to go squarely against the
2theory of rationalizability ` a la Arrow (1959), Richter (1966; 1971), Hansson (1968), Sen
(1971), Suzumura (1976a) and many others, where the weak axiom of revealed preference
is a necessary condition for rationalizability.
Recollect that the standard theory of rationalizability has an important point of bifur-
cation depending on the speciﬁcation of choice domains. The classical theory of revealed
preference due originally to Samuelson (1938; 1947; 1948; 1950) and Houthakker (1950)
was concerned with the choice functions on the domains of competitive budgets, whereas
the expansion of the choice functional theory beyond the narrow conﬁnement of compet-
itive consumers due to Arrow (1959) and Sen (1971) had a constraint of its own, and
presupposed that the domains were conﬁned to the ﬁnite sets of alternatives. See, also,
Aizerman and Aleskerov (1995), and Schwartz (1976) for further work along this line.
It was Richter (1966; 1971), Hansson (1968) and Suzumura (1976a; 1977; 1983) who
explored the general rationalizability theory without these domain constraints, thereby
making the theory universally applicable to whatever choice contexts we may want to
specify. Recent years have witnessed further development of the general theory of ra-
tionalizability in the tradition of Richter and Hansson without any external norm. See
Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2005; 2006) and Kim and Richter (1986), among oth-
ers. It is this general theory of rationalizability that we modify so as to develop a new
concept of norm-conditional rationalizability and build a bridge between rationalizability
theory and Sen’s criticism. In essence, what emerges from this modiﬁcation is the peaceful
co-existence of a norm-conditional rationalizability theory and Sen’s elaborated criticism
against internal consistency of choice.
How can we pursue this objective? Although Sen’s suggestion to the eﬀect that the
rationality, or its lack, of choice behavior cannot be judged only by means of the internal
structure of choices made is well taken, we can modify the axioms of revealed preference
theory in such a way as to provide an axiomatization of choices under external norms in
terms of the modiﬁed revealed preference axioms.
As an auxiliary step, we introduce a model of choice where external norms are taken
into consideration by specifying all pairs consisting of a feasible set and an element of
this set with the interpretation that this element is prohibited from being chosen from
this set by the relevant system of external norms. Norm-conditional rationalizability then
requires the existence of a preference relation such that, for each feasible set in the domain
of the choice function, the chosen elements are at least as good as all elements in the set
except for those that are prohibited by the external norm. This approach is very general
because no restrictions are imposed on how the system of external norms comes about—
3any speciﬁcation of a set of pairs as described above is possible. Needless to say, we do
not by any means suggest that any arbitrary system of norms thus speciﬁed is desirable;
clearly, what we advocate is a method to incorporate any norm into a model of choice
without completely eschewing all notions of traditional rationality altogether. In fact, the
traditional model of rational choice is included as a special case—the case that obtains if
the set of prohibited pairs is empty.
As a matter of fact, the ‘do-not-choose-the-last-apple’ example is not the only one
Sen (1993) uses to criticize internal choice consistency properties. A second example he
uses to call into question the imposition of internal choice consistency conditions goes as
follows. Suppose a decision-maker is oﬀered a cup of tea at a distant acquaintance’s place,
the feasible set thus consisting of the two alternatives ‘tea’ and ‘staying home.’ Suppose,
further, that the person chooses ‘tea.’ Now suppose the acquaintance oﬀers, in addition
to tea, the option of having some cocaine at her or his place. It may very well be the
case that, when faced with the new opportunity set consisting of the alternatives ‘tea,’
‘cocaine’ and ‘staying home,’ the last option is selected. Again, the standard axioms of
revealed preference are violated by this choice behavior. In the example, the opportunity
set (the menu) itself conveys information about the consequences of these choices: if
cocaine is oﬀered in addition to tea, the decision-maker’s perception of the acquaintance
may change and, as a consequence, he or she chooses not even to enter the acquaintance’s
house. This is what Sen (1993, p.502) refers to as the epistemic value of a menu. The
observation that opportunity sets may have epistemic value has been made before; for
example, Luce and Raiﬀa (1957) argue that the existence or absence of certain menu
items in a restaurant may inﬂuence a customer’s perception of the nature of the place
and thereby allow ‘irrelevant’ alternatives to aﬀect its choices; see Luce and Raiﬀa (1957,
p.288) for a detailed discussion.
In the speciﬁc example described above, the behavior of the decision-maker can be
explained if one is prepared to acknowledge that the objects of choice may not be the
objects of preference. The possible choices that can appear on menus are ‘tea,’ ‘cocaine’
and ‘staying home.’ The consequences the decision-maker may care about, however, are
more adequately described as ‘having tea at a place where cocaine is consumed’ (outcome
a), ‘having tea at a place that is presumed to be cocaine-free’ (outcome b), ‘having cocaine’
(outcome c) and ‘staying home’ (outcome d). If the menu consists of the options ‘tea’ and
‘staying home’ only, both ‘having tea at a place where cocaine is consumed’ and ‘having
tea at a place that is presumed to be cocaine-free’ are possible consequences of choosing
‘tea,’ whereas if the menu item ‘cocaine’ is added, this uncertainty disappears—‘having
4tea at a place that is presumed to be cocaine-free’ ceases to be a possible consequence of
accepting an invitation for tea.
Suppose the decision-maker’s (transitive) preferences are such that b is better than
d, d is better than a and a is better than c. The choice of ‘tea’ from the opportunity
set consisting of ‘tea’ and ‘staying home’ induces the set of possible consequences {a,b},
whereas choosing ‘tea’ from the menu consisting of ‘tea,’ ‘cocaine’ and ‘staying home’
has but one possible consequence—ending up with a with certainty. If the set of possible
outcomes {a,b} is, according to the decision rule under uncertainty the agent may employ,
better than the singleton set of possible outcomes {a}, the above-described choices can
be explained in the context of preference optimization once the distinction between choice
items and consequences is recognized and a preference relation on consequences is sup-
plemented with a preference relation on sets of possible consequences under uncertainty.
This criticism of Sen’s has been dealt with in Bossert (2001) and, thus, we do not discuss
it any further and refer the reader to the original paper instead.
3 Preference Relations and Choice Functions
We are now ready to introduce our analytical framework and deﬁne the basic concepts of
preference and choice that lie at the heart of the problem to be addressed here.
Let X be a universal non-empty set of alternatives and let R ⊆ X × X be a (binary)
relation on X. The asymmetric factor P(R) of R is given by (x,y) ∈ P(R) if and only if
(x,y) ∈ R and (y,x) 6∈ R for all x,y ∈ X, and the symmetric factor I(R) of R is deﬁned
by (x,y) ∈ I(R) if and only if (x,y) ∈ R and (y,x) ∈ R for all x,y ∈ X.
The transitive closure tc(R) of a relation R is deﬁned by letting, for all x,y ∈ X,
(x,y) ∈ tc(R) ⇔ there exist K ∈ N and x
0,...,x
K ∈ X such that
x = x
0 and (x
k−1,x
k) ∈ R for all k ∈ {1,...,K} and x
K = y.
For any binary relation R, tc(R) is the smallest transitive superset of R.
A relation R ⊆ X × X is reﬂexive if, for all x ∈ X,
(x,x) ∈ R
and R is complete if, for all x,y ∈ X such that x 6= y,
(x,y) ∈ R or (y,x) ∈ R.
5R is transitive if, for all x,y,z ∈ X,
[(x,y) ∈ R and (y,z) ∈ R] ⇒ (x,z) ∈ R.
It is clear that R is transitive if and only if R = tc(R). A quasi-ordering is a reﬂexive and
transitive relation and an ordering is a complete quasi-ordering.
R is consistent if, for all x,y ∈ X,
(x,y) ∈ tc(R) ⇒ (y,x) 6∈ P(R).
This notion of consistency is due to Suzumura (1976b) and it is equivalent to the require-
ment that any cycle must be such that all relations involved in this cycle are instances of
indiﬀerence—strict preference cannot occur. To facilitate the understanding of this con-
cept, we may deﬁne the consistent closure cc(R) of R as the smallest consistent superset
of R. This is the concept coined by Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2005), which may
be written explicitly as follows. For all x,y ∈ X,
(x,y) ∈ cc(R) ⇔ (x,y) ∈ R or [(x,y) ∈ tc(R) and (y,x) ∈ R].
Clearly, for any binary relation R, we have R ⊆ cc(R) ⊆ tc(R) and R is consistent if
and only if R = cc(R). It is easy to verify that consistency implies (but is not implied
by) the well-known acyclicity axiom which rules out the existence of strict preference
cycles (cycles composed entirely of instances of strict preference). Consistency and quasi-
transitivity, which requires that P(R) is transitive, are independent. Transitivity implies
consistency but the reverse implication is not true in general. However, if R is reﬂexive
and complete, consistency and transitivity are equivalent.
A relation R∗ is an extension of R if and only if R ⊆ R∗ and P(R) ⊆ P(R∗). If an
extension R∗ of R is an ordering, we refer to R∗ as an ordering extension of R. One of
the most fundamental results on extensions of binary relations is due to Szpilrajn (1930)
who showed that any transitive and asymmetric relation has a transitive, asymmetric and
complete extension. The result remains true if asymmetry is replaced with reﬂexivity,
that is, any quasi-ordering has an ordering extension. Arrow (1951, p.64) stated this
generalization of Szpilrajn’s theorem without a proof and Hansson (1968) provided a
proof on the basis of Szpilrajn’s original theorem. While the property of being a quasi-
ordering is suﬃcient for the existence of an ordering extension of a relation, this is not
necessary. As shown by Suzumura (1976b), consistency is necessary and suﬃcient for the
existence of an ordering extension; see Suzumura (1976b, pp.389–390).
6A choice situation is described by a feasible set S of alternatives, where S is a non-
empty subset of X. External norms such as those discussed in the introduction can be
expressed by identifying feasible sets and alternatives that are not to be chosen from these
feasible sets. For example, suppose there is a feasible set S = {x,y}, where x stands for
selecting nothing and y stands for selecting (a single) apple. Now consider the feasible
set T = {x,y,z} where there are two (identical) apples y and z available. The external
norm not to take the last apple can easily and intuitively be expressed by requiring that
the choice of y from S is excluded, whereas the choice of y (or z) from T is perfectly
acceptable. In general, norms of that nature can be expressed by identifying all pairs
(S,w), where w ∈ S, such that w is not supposed to be chosen from the feasible set S. To
that end, we use a set N, to be interpreted as the set of all pairs (S,w) of a feasible set
S and an element w of S such that the choice of w from S is prevented by the external
norm under consideration.
More formally, suppose X is the power set of X excluding the empty set. A choice
function is a mapping C:Σ → X such that C(S) ⊆ S\{z ∈ S | (S,z) ∈ N} for all S ∈ Σ,
where Σ ⊆ X with Σ 6= ∅ is the domain of C. Let C(Σ) denote the image of Σ under
C, that is, C(Σ) = ∪S∈ΣC(S). As is customary, we assume that C(S) is non-empty for
all sets S in the domain of C. Thus, using Richter’s (1971) term, the choice function
C is assumed to be decisive. To ensure that this requirement does not conﬂict with the
restrictions imposed by the norm N, we require N to be such that, for all S ∈ Σ, there
exists x ∈ S satisfying (S,x) 6∈ N. The set of all possible norms satisfying this restriction
is denoted by N.
Returning to Sen’s example involving the norm “do not choose the last available
apple,” we can, for instance, deﬁne the universal set X = {x,y,z}, the domain Σ =
{S,T} ( X with S = {x,y} and T = {x,y,z}, and the external norm described by the
set N = {(S,y)}. Thus, the external norm requires that y 6∈ C(S) but no restrictions are
imposed on the choice C(T) from the set T—that is, this external norm represents the
requirement that the last available apple should not be chosen.
4 Norm-Conditional Rationalizability
The notion of rationality explored in this paper is conditional on a system of external
norms N ∈ N as introduced in the previous section. In contrast with the classical model
of rational choice, an element x that is chosen by a choice function C from a feasible set
S ∈ Σ need not be considered at least as good as all elements of S by a rationalizing
7relation, but merely at least as good as all elements y ∈ S such that (S,y) 6∈ N. That
is, if the choice of y from S is already prohibited by the norm, there is no need that x
dominates such an element y according to the rationalization. Needless to say, the chosen
element x itself must be admissible in the presence of the prevailing system of external
norms.
To make this concept of norm-conditional rationalizability precise, let a system of
external norms N ∈ N and a feasible set S ∈ Σ be given. An N-admissible set for
(N,S), AN(S) ⊆ S, is deﬁned by letting, for all x ∈ S,
x ∈ A
N(S) ⇔ (S,x) 6∈ N.
Note that, by assumption, AN(S) 6= ∅ for all N ∈ N and for all S ∈ Σ.
We say that a choice function C on Σ is N-rationalizable if and only if there exists a
binary relation RN ⊆ X × X such that, for all S ∈ Σ and for all x ∈ S,
x ∈ C(S) ⇔ x ∈ A
N(S) and [(x,y) ∈ R
N for all y ∈ A
N(S)].
In this case, we say that RN N-rationalizes C, or RN is an N-rationalization of C.
To facilitate our analysis of N-rationalizability, a generalization of the notion of the
direct revealed preference relation RC ⊆ X × X of a choice function C is of use. For all
x,y ∈ X,
(x,y) ∈ RC ⇔ there exists S ∈ Σ such that [x ∈ C(S) and y ∈ A
N(S)].
The (indirect) revealed preference relation of C is the transitive closure tc(RC) of the
direct revealed preference relation RC.
We consider three basic versions of norm-conditional rationalizability. The ﬁrst is
N-rationalizability by itself, where an N-rationalization RN does not have to possess
any additional property (such as reﬂexivity, completeness, consistency or transitivity).
This notion of rationalizability is equivalent to N-rationalizability by a reﬂexive relation
(this is also true for the standard deﬁnition of rationalizability without external norms;
see Richter, 1971). The second is N-rationalizability by a consistent relation (again,
reﬂexivity can be added and an equivalent condition is obtained; see Bossert, Sprumont
and Suzumura, 2005). Finally, we consider N-rationalizability by a transitive relation
which, again as in the classical case, turns out to be equivalent to N-rationalizability by
an ordering; see Richter (1966; 1971).
We are now ready to identify a necessary and suﬃcient condition for each one of these
notions of N-rationalizability of a choice function. To obtain a necessary and suﬃcient
8condition for simple N-rationalizability (that is, N-rationalizability by a binary relation
RN that does not have to possess any further property), we follow Richter (1971) by
generalizing the relevant axiom in his approach in order to accommodate an externally
imposed system of norms N. This leads us to the following axiom.
N-conditional direct-revelation coherence: For all S ∈ Σ and for all x ∈ AN(S),
[(x,y) ∈ RC for all y ∈ A
N(S)] ⇒ x ∈ C(S).
Our ﬁrst result establishes that this property is indeed necessary and suﬃcient for N-
rationalizability.
Theorem 1 Let N ∈ N be a system of external norms and let C be a choice function.
C is N-rationalizable if and only if C satisﬁes N-conditional direct-revelation coherence.
As is the case for the traditional model of rational choice on general domains, it is
straightforward to verify that N-rationalizability by a reﬂexive relation is equivalent to
N-rationalizability without any further properties of an N-rationalization; this can be
veriﬁed analogously to Richter (1971). However, adding completeness as a requirement
leads to a stronger notion of N-rationalizability; see again Richer (1971).
Next, we examine N-rationalizability by a consistent relation, which is equivalent
to N-rationalizability by a reﬂexive and consistent relation. As in the traditional case,
adding completeness, however, leads to a stronger property, namely, one that is equivalent
to N-rationalizability by an ordering; see Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2005) for an
analogous observation in the traditional model.
The requisite necessary and suﬃcient condition is obtained from N-conditional direct-
revelation coherence by replacing RC with its consistent closure cc(RC).
N-conditional consistent-closure coherence: For all S ∈ Σ and for all x ∈ AN(S),
[(x,y) ∈ cc(RC) for all y ∈ A
N(S)] ⇒ x ∈ C(S).
We obtain
Theorem 2 Let N ∈ N be a system of external norms and let C be a choice function.
C is N-rationalizable by a consistent relation if and only if C satisﬁes N-conditional
consistent-closure coherence.
9Our ﬁnal result establishes a necessary and suﬃcient condition for N-rationalizability
by a transitive relation which is equivalent to N-rationalizability by an ordering. We leave
it to the reader to verify that the proof strategy employed by Richter (1966; 1971) in the
traditional case generalizes in a straightforward manner to the norm-dependent model
when establishing that transitive N-rationalizability is equivalent to N-rationalizability
by an ordering.
The requisite necessary and suﬃcient condition is obtained from N-conditional direct-
revelation coherence by replacing RC with its transitive closure tc(RC).
N-conditional transitive-closure coherence: For all S ∈ Σ and for all x ∈ AN(S),
[(x,y) ∈ tc(RC) for all y ∈ A
N(S)] ⇒ x ∈ C(S).
We obtain
Theorem 3 Let N ∈ N be a system of external norms and let C be a choice function.
C is N-rationalizable by a transitive relation if and only if C satisﬁes N-conditional
transitive-closure coherence.
5 Alternative Formulations
Our model of norm-conditional choice may appear somewhat restrictive at ﬁrst sight
because it speciﬁes pairs of a feasible set and a single object not to be chosen from that
set. One might want to consider the following seeming generalization of this approach:
instead of only including pairs of the form (S,x) with x ∈ S when deﬁning a system of
norms, one could include pairs such as (S,S0) with S0 ⊆ S, thus postulating that the subset
S0 should not be chosen from S. Contrary to ﬁrst appearance, this does not really provide
a more general model of norm-conditional rationalizability because, in order to formulate
our notion of norm-conditional rationality, we require that a chosen element x ∈ C(S)
has to be at least as good as all feasible elements except those that are already excluded
by the external norm according to a norm-conditional rationalization—that is, x has to
be at least as good as all y ∈ S except for those y ∈ S such that (S,y) ∈ N. Allowing for
pairs (S,S0) does not provide a more general notion of norm-conditional rationalizability
because the subset of S, the elements of which have to be dominated by a chosen object,
can be obtained in any arbitrary way from the subsets S0 such that S0 cannot be selected
from S according to the external norm. For simplicity of exposition, we work with the
10simpler version of our model but note that this formulation does not involve any loss of
generality when it comes to the deﬁnition of norm-conditional rationality employed in this
paper.
An alternative formulation, based on a suggestion of one of the referees, is to use a
norm-embodying relation R ⊆ (X × X) × (X × X), where a pair (x,S) with x ∈ S ⊆ X
stands for the act of choosing x from a choice environment S given an underlying norm.
The statement ((x,S),(y,T)) ∈ R can then be interpreted to mean that choosing x from
the admissible choice environment S is at least as good as choosing y from T in term of
conformity with the requisite external norm. This approach can then be used to deﬁne
notions of norm-conditional rationalizability that parallel ours.
Ours is not the ﬁrst attempt to accommodate Sen’s (1993) criticism within a suitably
modiﬁed theory of rational choice. In response to Sen (1993), Baigent and Gaertner (1996)
employ a non-standard notion of rationalizability that obeys the restriction imposed by
the external norm not to choose the uniquely greatest element according to some relation
but behaves as the traditional version of rationalizability when the set of greatest objects
contains at least two elements. Baigent and Gaertner (1996) deﬁne, for a feasible set
S ∈ X and for a relation R on X, the set G∗(S,R) as
G
∗(S,R) =
(
G(S,R) if |G(S,R)| = 1
∅ otherwise.
According to Baigent and Gaertner (1996, p.244), a choice function C is non-standard
rationalizable if there exists a transitive relation R on X such that, for all S ∈ Σ,
C(S) = G(S \ G
∗(S,R),R). (1)
The set of chosen elements is assumed to be non-empty implying that, implicitly, Baigent
and Gaertner (1996) do not include singleton sets in their domain. A choice function
that is rationalizable in the sense of (1) selects all second-greatest elements according to
a rationalizing relation if there is a unique greatest element; if there are several greatest
elements, C chooses all of these greatest elements. Baigent and Gaertner (1996, p.241)
state that they axiomatize the maxim “always choose the second largest except in those
cases where there are at least two pieces which are largest, being of equal size. In that
case, either may be chosen.” However, this informal maxim appears to be in conﬂict
with the formal deﬁnition and characterization provided by Baigent and Gaertner (1996,
p.243). According to (1), if there is no unique greatest element, all greatest elements are
chosen and not just one of them. Thus, there is a gap between their formal axiomatization
11and the informal maxim, the axiomatization of the latter being left unaccomplished so
far. Moreover, their model is restricted to a rather narrow class of choice problems. If,
instead of having two apples in the feasible set, the decision-maker faces a fruit basket
containing one apple and one orange, picking the second-greatest element according to
some rationalizing relation no longer seems to represent reasonable behavior: the fact that
I as the decision-maker prefer apples to oranges, say, does not mean other people have the
same preferences and, as a consequence, norms of politeness and decency do not dictate
the choice of the orange—what if everyone else at the table prefers oranges to apples?
Gaertner and Xu (1999a) discuss an alternative approach covering cases where external
norms may lead to the choice of the median alternative(s) according to some antisym-
metric relation on X. This approach is compared to the traditional rational choice setup
and to the Baigent and Gaertner (1996) framework in the antisymmetric case in Gaertner
and Xu (1997) and in a more general setting in Gaertner and Xu (1999b).
An alternative type of norm-constrained choice is characterized in Gaertner and Xu
(2004). The choice functions analyzed in this contribution have a domain that contains
the empty set in addition to all non-empty subsets of X and, moreover, choice sets may be
empty even if feasible sets are non-empty. The behavior Gaertner and Xu (2004) attempt
to capture is the refusal to make a choice in response to the suppression of alternatives:
if there is but a single alternative available, the decision-maker may choose the empty
set as a means of expressing his or her displeasure with the suppression of other feasible
alternatives. An example put forward by Sen (1997, p.755) and used by Gaertner and
Xu (2004) as a motivation of their approach is that of a government that outlaws all
newspapers but one that is owned by the government itself. They argue that if several
papers are available, the government paper may well be the choice of a decision-maker,
but the absence of any alternative sources leads the agent to boycott the single available
news outlet.
Xu (2007) discusses some special cases of norm-conditional rationalizability, namely,
a variant of the Baigent and Gaertner (1996) ‘never-choose-the-uniquely-largest’ rule, the
median-based rule (see Gaertner and Xu, 1999a) and two versions of the ‘protest-based’
norm of Gaertner and Xu (2004). These special cases are obtained by ruling out the
choice of unique best elements, elements better than the (bottom) median element, and
non-empty choices in the case of single-valued feasible sets. See also Baigent (2007) for a
summary and discussion of the relevant literature.
126 Conclusion
Instead of summarizing the main contents of this short paper, let us conclude with a
remark on the literature with some relevance to the present paper.
It was Sen (1997) who made an important step towards the norm-conditional theory
of rationalizability through the concept of self-imposed choice constraints, excluding the
choice of some alternatives from permissible conducts. Let M(S,R) denote the set of
R-maximal elements in S according to R, that is, the set of all elements of S that are not
strictly preferred by any other element in S. According to Sen’s (1997, p.769) scenario,
“the person may ﬁrst restrict the choice options ... by taking a ‘permissible’ subset K(S),
reﬂecting self-imposed constraints, and then seek the maximal elements M(K(S),R) in
K(S).” Despite an apparent family resemblance between Sen’s concept of self-imposed
choice constraints and our concept of norm-conditionality, Sen did not go as far as to
bridge the idea of norm-induced constraints and the theory of rationalizability as we did
in this paper.
It is hoped that the present paper provides the missing link in the existing literature
and shows that external norms can be made neatly compatible with a suitably modiﬁed
revealed preference theory.
7 Proofs
We ﬁrst provide three preliminary results. The following lemma states that the direct
revealed preference relation RC must be respected by any N-rationalization RN. This
observation parallels that of Samuelson (1948; 1950) in the traditional framework; see also
Richter (1971).
Lemma 1 Let N ∈ N be a system of external norms and let C be a choice function. If
RN is an N-rationalization of C, then RC ⊆ RN.
Proof. Suppose that RN is an N-rationalization of C and x,y ∈ X are such that
(x,y) ∈ RC. By deﬁnition of RC, there exists S ∈ Σ such that x ∈ C(S) and y ∈ AN(S).
Because RN is an N-rationalization of C, we obtain (x,y) ∈ RN. Thus, RC ⊆ RN must
be true.
Analogously, any consistent N-rationalization RN must respect not only the direct
revealed preference relation RC but also its consistent closure cc(RC).
13Lemma 2 Let N ∈ N be a system of external norms and let C be a choice function. If
RN is a consistent N-rationalization of C, then cc(RC) ⊆ RN.
Proof. Suppose that RN is a consistent N-rationalization of C and x,y ∈ X are such that
(x,y) ∈ cc(RC). By deﬁnition of the consistent closure of a binary relation, (x,y) ∈ RC
or [(x,y) ∈ tc(RC) and (y,x) ∈ RC] must hold. If (x,y) ∈ RC, (x,y) ∈ RN follows from
Lemma 1. If [(x,y) ∈ tc(RC) and (y,x) ∈ RC], there exist K ∈ N and x0,...,xK ∈ X
such that x = x0, (xk−1,xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1,...,K} and xK = y. By Lemma
1, (xk−1,xk) ∈ RN for all k ∈ {1,...,K} and, thus, (x,y) ∈ tc(RN). Furthermore,
(y,x) ∈ RC implies (y,x) ∈ RN by Lemma 1 again. If (x,y) 6∈ RN, it follows that
(y,x) ∈ P(RN) in view of (y,x) ∈ RN. Because (x,y) ∈ tc(RN), this contradicts the
consistency of RN. Therefore, (x,y) ∈ RN. Thus, cc(RC) ⊆ RN must be true.
Finally, if transitivity is required as a property of an N-rationalization RN, this rela-
tion must respect the transitive closure tc(RC) of RC.
Lemma 3 Let N ∈ N be a system of external norms and let C be a choice function. If
RN is a transitive N-rationalization of C, then tc(RC) ⊆ RN.
Proof. Suppose that RN is a transitive N-rationalization of C and x,y ∈ X are such
that (x,y) ∈ tc(RC). By deﬁnition of the transitive closure of a binary relation RC, there
exist K ∈ N and x0,...,xK ∈ X such that x = x0, (xk−1,xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1,...,K}
and xK = y. By Lemma 1, we obtain x = x0, (xk−1,xk) ∈ RN for all k ∈ {1,...,K}
and xK = y. Repeated application of the transitivity of RN implies (x,y) ∈ RN. Thus
tc(RC) ⊆ RN must hold.
Proof of Theorem 1. “Only if.” Suppose RN is an N-rationalization of C. Let S ∈ Σ
and x ∈ AN(S) be such that (x,y) ∈ RC for all y ∈ AN(S). By Lemma 1, (x,y) ∈ RN
for all y ∈ AN(S), which implies x ∈ C(S) because RN is an N-rationalization of C.
“If.” Suppose C satisﬁes N-conditional direct-revelation coherence. We complete the
proof by showing that RN = RC is an N-rationalization of C. Let S ∈ Σ and x ∈ AN(S).
Suppose ﬁrst that x ∈ C(S). By deﬁnition, it follows immediately that (x,y) ∈ RC =
RN for all y ∈ AN(S).
Conversely, suppose that (x,y) ∈ RC = RN for all y ∈ AN(S). It follows that
N-conditional direct-revelation coherence immediately implies x ∈ C(S). Thus, C is
N-rationalizable by RN = RC.
14Proof of Theorem 2. The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 1. All that needs to
be done is replace RC with cc(RC) and invoke Lemma 2 instead of Lemma 1.
Proof of Theorem 3. Again, the proof is analogous to that of Theorem 1. All that
needs to be done is replace RC with tc(RC) and invoke Lemma 3 instead of Lemma 1.
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